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Chapter 2 
 
Price Setting Institutions 
 
In China, the price of drugs had been kept low until the mid 1980s so that basic 
medical care would be affordable for the general public. The medical care system 
was decentralized due to the progress of fiscal reform in China. Fiscal reform 
requires the local government to be responsible through their budget for the social 
security system. Thus, fiscal subsidies for the hospital and healthcare sector are 
limited, and as a result they are also required to operate by means of their own 
revenues. In this way, since the middle of the 1980s, the prices for medical 
services were adjusted to compensate for the operating costs of the healthcare 
sector. 
 
2.1 The Principles of Price Setting 
 
The current price setting mechanism in operation has following principles: 1) the 
State Development and Reform Committee (SDRC) has set a price cap on the 
retail price of drugs in the medical drug catalogues. 2) The price margin rule 
between forms of drug (差比价格规则). The SDRC also set a price ratio among 
forms of drug, using a normal tablet as a reference. 3) However, patented drugs are 
free to have the maximum retail price set, being independent of government price 
regulations (sole setting price: 单独定价).4) Auction is employed in the central 
tendering system of drugs at provincial level. The firms are faced with duplicated 
price controlling mechanism.  
 
2.1.2 Price Cap by the SDRC 
 
From 1980 to the present day, the governments have controlled every step of a 
drug’s pricing: the manufacturer’s shipment price, the wholesale price and the 
retail prices. Currently, the SDRC sets official prices based on the “Announcement 
on Official Price Setting Mechanism on Pharmaceuticals” promulgated in 2000. 
That announcement laid out the following “cost plus” pricing formula: 
  
Domestic retail (maximum) official price = Wholesaler’s price + 15% 
margin 
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Wholesaler’s price = Manufacturer’s shipment price + 15% margin 
 Manufacturer’s price = Production cost + Sales fee + 5% Sales margin                   
  
This pricing formula is applied for the “official prices” and “special prices” 
categories in Table 8, which shows the current pricing system of pharmaceuticals 
in China. 
 
Table 8: Retail Drug Price Setting Mechanism by Purchasers 
 
Price  Price Setting 
Mechanism 
Drug 
Catalogues/ 
Types 
Insurance 
Reimbursement 
Ratio 
Official 
Prices 
Officially 
set 
SDRC set a national 
unified maximum 
retail price 
UEMIL A list 100%  
 Guideline  Local governments 
can adjust within a 
range of 5%. 
UEMIL B list Fixed ratio set by 
the local 
governments (90% 
for Shanghai) 
Special 
Prices 
Officially 
set 
SDRC set a national 
unified maximum 
retail price 
Special drugs 
such as 
anesthetics, 
vaccines, etc. 
 Guideline  SDRC set a maximum 
retail price 
Patent protected 
drugs 
If the drug is not on 
the UEMIL 
Catalogue, 0%.  
Market 
Adjustmen
t Price 
Sole setting 
prices 
(单独定价) 
If firms are not 
satisfactory with the 
SDRC price and with 
sufficient reasons to 
set higher price, firm 
can apply. 
 Depends on 
reimbursement 
ratio on the drug 
catalogues 
Free 
Pricing  
 Firms can set the price 
as they like 
Drugs not on 
the Catalogues 
0% 
(Source) Japan Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, Information on China’s 
pharmaceuticals (in Japanese) 
(Note) UEMIL: urban employment medical insurance  
 
 
2.2 Auctions Through the Centralized Tendering Drug Procurement 
Policy  
 
In addition to the SDRC’s price control on the medical insurance drug catalogue, 
there is another mechanism relating to drug prices: the Centralized Tendering Drug 
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Procurement Policy, which operates at the provincial level. In 1999, centralized 
tendering drug procurement was initiated in order to overcome “high drug prices 
and corruption.” First, the government sector expected to reduce drug prices by 
monopolizing the purchasing power of hospitals toward pharmaceutical firms and 
utilizing an auctioning mechanism. Secondly, by utilizing these auctions, the 
government expected to open up the drugs’ procurement process. 
 
It is true that by monopolizing both purchasing and auctions, you can expect to 
reduce the procurement prices of drugs. However, you cannot say that it reduces 
the retail prices for patients. As we can see in Figure 2, the hospital and physician 
have, by their nature, an information advantage over the choice of drugs, and thus 
they have the power of monopoly over patients. Furthermore, in China, hospitals 
greatly depend upon the drug price margin, and thus they prefer to prescribe 
expensive drugs. As long as this factor exists, a reduction of a drug’s procurement 
price will only increase the profit margin of hospitals, and will not reduce that 
drug’s retail price. In addition to this problem of hospitals’ incentive and 
motivation, the situation has become even more complicated as several price 
regulations regarding drugs are duplicated: the SDRC sets the maximum retail 
price and official margin, but on the other hand, the provincial government 
requires to that even lower prices be bid in auction.   
 
The pharmaceutical industry has continued to oppose this method of centralized 
procurement, and 13 pharmaceutical associations sent a letter to the government 
requesting that they halt this mechanism. They claim that, given the highly 
competitive situation in the pharmaceutical industry and hospital’s high 
dependence on the drug price margin in China, the current institutions are only 
strengthening the power of monopoly that hospitals have over suppliers.  
Furthermore, the current drug procurement scheme pays much less attention to the 
actual quality of drugs. We will analyze later what kind of situation would 
presumably occur under the current setting.  
 
Regarding the retail price cap, the SDRC has started to aggressively reduce the 
official price. From 1997 to 2007, the SDRC consecutively implemented a drug 
price reduction 24 times. In May 2007, they announced that they had completed 
reductions on 1500 types of drugs on the drug catalogue controlled by the central 
government.  
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Figure 2: Duplicated Drug Price Regulation 
Pharmaceutical firms 
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2.3 Case Study: Guangdong “Sunshine” Drug Procurement Scheme 
 
At the end of 2006, Guangdong Province announced plans to implement a new 
style of drug procurement auction called the “Guangdong Sunshine Drug 
Procurement Scheme.” In 2007, the new method of auctioning requires the auction 
to take place on the Internet. The procedure for the auction is as follows: 
(http://www.gdyyzb.cn/bpportal/Article.asp?articleid=2103).  
 
Step 1: Set the maximum limit price. For the officially-priced drugs, this 
refers to the official price – 15% hospital margin. For the market 
adjustment price, take the lower price of the following two: either, 75% 
(from high to low) of the price for the minimum unit in that category (75% 
maximum price 
 
 
 
 
OTC 
Centralized tendering drug procurement: auction 
Information asymmetry 
on drug prescription 
monopoly 
 
 Competition 
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bulk line price), or 75% (from high to low) of the price for that category 
where the number of bidders is the largest. 
 
Step 2: Set up the bidding category by quality. For the official price, 
follow the official price drug quality category. For the market adjustment 
price, classify into 1) Patented drug, 2) Expired patent drug, 3) GMP drug.  
   
Step 3: Bidding  
(1)  Preliminary bidding. If the number of the bidders is less than 3, move 
to the price negotiation process. If there are more than 3 bidders, start 
the first round of bidding.  
(2)  Price negotiations are 1) negotiation with the experts, 2) voting by 
the experts, 3) counter-offers on a price by the experts. 
(3)  The first round of bidding. If the number of bidders is less than 10, 
the bidder with the highest price is eliminated. The rest will move on 
to the second round of bidding on the second day. If the number of 
bidders is 10 or more, the 15% with the highest bids are eliminated. If 
number of bidders is reduced to the quota (see Table 9), the remaining 
producers will be put on the list. 
 (4) The second and third rounds of bidding. Repeat the bidding following 
the same procedure as above.  
 
Step 4: The hospital will select the drug and supplier from the suppliers 
selected by the above procedure, and make a contract of supply.  
 
Table 9: Rules of Bidding Selection 
 
 Quota 
# of Bidders First Bidding Second Bidding Third Bidding 
3 2 2 2 
4 3 3 3 
5 4 3 3 
6 5 4 4 
7 6 5 4 
8 7 6 5 
9 8 7 6 
10 9 8 6 
10 above 85% of # of 70% of # of 55% of # of 
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preliminary bidders preliminary bidders preliminary bidders 
(Source) Procedures of the Guangdong Drug Procurement Sunshine Procurement 
Scheme. (http://www.gdyyzb.cn/bpportal/Article.asp?articleid=2103) 
 
Under this scheme, competition via auction will reduces prices to the minimum 
level that the manufacturers can offer. This is not new for the generic 
manufacturers. As the number of bidders for generic drug was large, they have 
already faced competition via auction. The new scheme will have more of an 
impact on drugs in the monopolized category, where only 2 or 1 bidders appear. In 
this category, the drugs can often be priced however the firms like, but now, under 
the new scheme, prices will be suppressed either through discussions with experts, 
or by voting or counter offers on the price, even if the auction will not take place 
because the number of competitors is limited by the nature of the patented drugs. 
However, there is no principle on the price negotiation process (Step 3 (2)). 
 
The Guangdong case is a model for the new model of auctions.  Following 
Guangdong, Fujian Province is about to implement auctions under a similar model. 
Here, the organizer of the auctions has announced that their maximum price 
should be 20% lower than the results of Guangdong’s bidding. Although the SDRC 
announced that they had completed the reduction of the retail price cap, he 
reduction of procurement prices through auctions will continue for a while. 
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